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One hardly needs reminding that there is a 
refugee crisis. The war in Syria and Iraq, the 
huddled masses in refugee camps in Turkey, 
Lebanon, Iran, and Jordan, and the reports of 
migrants drowning in the Mediterranean and 
Aegean seas are reminder enough. According 
to the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) “We are witnessing a par-
adigm change, an unchecked slide into an era in 
which the scale of global forced displacement 
as well as the response required is now clearly 
dwarfing anything seen before” (UNHCR 
2015a, p. 3). The UNHCR’s estimate of the 
number of forcibly displaced people worldwide 
reached 59.5 million by the end of 2014, up 
from 51.2 million in 2013 and from 37.5 million 
a decade ago.
This total includes asylum seekers, stateless 
persons, returned refugees, and above all, 38.2 
million people who are internally displaced 
within the borders of their home country. Only 
a fraction of the 60 million are refugees, defined 
by the Refugee Convention as those who have 
been displaced outside their origin country 
owing to a “ well-founded fear of persecution” (United Nations 1951) Most of these (86 per-
cent in 2014) are located in less developed coun-
tries, often in squalid camps with little security. 
Figure 1 shows the trends in the worldwide 
stock of refugees (excluding Palestinians who 
fall outside the UNHCR’s mandate). The stock 
of refugees rose to a peak of 18 million in 1992, 
then declined until 2005. Since then there has 
been an increasingly steep resurgence although 
by 2014 the numbers had not yet reached the 
peak of 1992.
Figure 1 also plots the annual flow of appli-
cants for asylum in 38 “industrialized” countries. 
This is a minority of all asylum applications 
worldwide, but it is the flow that has consistently 
grabbed the headlines. Asylum applications 
ascended to a peak in 1992 following the fall of 
the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, with another surge in the early 2000s, 
and a steep increase since 2010. Although there 
is no clear trend over the last quarter of a cen-
tury, there was a sharp upward step in the 1980s, 
which was only partially reversed. The last few 
years up to 2014 show a similar increase (but 
from a higher base) and the numbers are set to 
surpass the 1992 peak by a wide margin. While 
the recent surge of asylum seekers, accompanied 
by a partial collapse of border controls, invites 
comparison with the run-up to 1992, it is not 
Figure 1. Refugees and Asylum Seekers, 1982–2014
Sources: UNHCR (2015b) and UNHCR (various years). 
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yet clear whether this is a shift to a permanently 
higher level of asylum applications.
I. Determinants of Asylum Applications
Recent experience in the Mediterranean 
and the Aegean has rekindled the debate over 
whether those claiming asylum in the West are 
genuine refugees or simply “economic migrants” 
from poor countries seeking a better life. On one 
hand, it is argued that most applicants are from 
countries embroiled in civil wars and human 
rights abuse. On the other hand, it is pointed 
out that less than half of all applicants are rec-
ognized as refugees (as defined in the 1951 
Refugee Convention) or otherwise accepted on 
humanitarian grounds as in need of protection. 
Several studies have estimated the determinants 
of worldwide refugee stocks and asylum flows. 
Focusing on origin countries, Davenport, Moore, 
and Poe (2003) found that the stock of displaced 
persons could be explained mainly by geno-
cide, civil war, dissident conflicts, and political 
regime transitions. Moore and Shellman (2007) 
obtained similar results in a study of bilateral 
refugee movements, also finding effects of con-
flict in border countries and of migration costs 
for movements further afield. GDP per capita in 
the origin country had a negative effect on ref-
ugee displacements and also on asylum flows 
to the developed world (Hatton 2009), so eco-
nomic conditions in origin countries do seem to 
matter.
A second set of issues is destination coun-
try “pull” effects, such as high incomes and 
the prospects of employment. But above all, 
the debate has been about the ever tougher asy-
lum policies that have been implemented in the 
developed world. Some argue that, in the face 
of persecution, genuine refugees will migrate 
no matter what the risks and hardships. Tougher 
policies simply make life harder for them while 
doing little to stem the flow. Others (including 
most governments) evidently believe that relax-
ing asylum policies would open the floodgates 
to mass influx. As several studies have shown, 
the truth lies somewhere in between: policies 
have some deterrent effects but war, violence, 
human rights abuse, and economic conditions in 
origin countries matter even more (Hatton 2009; 
Neumayer 2004; Thielemann 2006).
Here I examine a database of asylum appli-
cations to 19 OECD destinations from 48 origin 
countries over the years  1997–2012. These are 
generally first instance applications made at or 
within destination country borders, as reported 
by governments to the UNHCR. The origin 
countries account for 86 percent of all applica-
tions to the 19 destinations. Out of a possible 
912 origin/destination dyads I select 626 for 
which the number of applications over the 16 
years exceeds 300. War, terror, and oppression 
in origin countries are measured by the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program’s index of civil war com-
bat deaths, the Political Terror Scale, and the 
Freedom House indices of civil liberties and 
political rights. Real GDP per capita is taken 
from the Penn World Tables. Dyadic variables 
are the stock of adult migrants from the origin 
residing at the destination in 2001/1 and the 
distance between origin and destination country 
capital cities.
The attractiveness of the destination country 
is represented by real GDP per capita and the 
unemployment rate. I also include an index of 
the toughness of asylum policies. This index 
comprises 15 components, each of which 
increases by one unit when policy becomes 
tougher. These capture changes in a coun-
try’s laws, regulations, or practice and they are 
intended to represent major changes in policy 
that, one way or another, disadvantage asylum 
seekers. They are subdivided into three groups: 
policies that limit access to the territory, those 
that relate to the procedure to determine whether 
an applicant qualifies for refugee status, and 
those that represent welfare conditions during 
and immediately after processing (all of these 
variables are described in more detail in Hatton 
and Moloney 2015).
II. Econometric Results
Table 1 presents fixed effects regressions, 
with standard errors clustered by origin country, 
where the dependent variable is the log of appli-
cations per capita of the origin country popula-
tion. The first column includes fixed effects by 
origin country with dummies for destination and 
year (not reported). One of the strongest origin 
country effects comes from the Political Terror 
Scale where a one point increase in terror (on the 
scale of 1 to 5) increases applications by around 
20 percent. Lack of civil liberties (on a scale of 
1 to 7, where higher values mean less freedom) 
also has a substantial positive effect, whereas 
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lack of political rights evidently does not. While 
political oppression may increase the incentive 
to flee, it may also reduce the ability to leave 
the country. Civil war deaths is not significant, 
largely because its effects are dominated by the 
other variables that capture governance failures 
and a wide range of human rights abuses.
The coefficient on origin country GDP per 
capita offers some support for the view that 
adverse economic conditions at home spur asy-
lum migration, even though poverty may also 
constrain the ability to migrate. A 10 percent 
increase in GDP per capita reduces applica-
tions by around 5 percent. Not surprisingly the 
migrant stock captures the  well-known “friends 
and relatives effect,” and this goes a consider-
able way to explaining  cross-sectional differ-
ences in the scale of bilateral migration streams. 
But even in the presence of the migrant stock, 
which captures past migration flows, distance 
still matters. The elasticity implies that the 
volume of applications declines steeply with 
Table 1—Determinants of Asylum Applications 
Dependent Variable log (Asylum Applications/Population)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Political terror scale  0.214**
(4.48) 
 0.221**
(4.53)
 0.221**
(4.57)
Civil liberties (Freedom House index)  0.285**(4.93)
 0.289**
(4.74)
 0.292**
(4.80)
Political rights (Freedom House index)  −0.044
(1.06)
 −0.050
(1.21)
 −0.049
(1.19)
Civil war battle deaths (000s)  0.012(0.76)
 0.010
(0.62)
 0.010
(0.64)
log origin country real GDP per capita  −0.517**
(2.35)
 −0.533**
(2.26)
 −0.542**
(2.32)
log migrant stock in 2000/1 from origin at destination  0.226**(8.54)
 0.226**
(8.59)
log distance from origin to destination  −0.777**
(4.07)
 −0.768**
(4.00)
log destination country GDP per capita  0.178
(0.35)
 0.066
(0.12)  −0.122(0.23)
 0.043
(0.09)
Unemployment rate at destination  −0.025**
(2.22)
 −0.024**
(2.14)
 −0.024**
(2.19)
 −0.029**
(2.60)
Asylum policy index overall  −0.046**
(4.03)
Policy on access  −0.115**
(3.08)
 −0.110**
(3.19)
Policy on processing  −0.100**
(6.45)
 −0.103**
(6.78)
Policy on welfare  0.049*
(1.76)
 0.034
(1.21)
Fixed effects
(number of FE)
Origin
(48) Origin × Dest (626)
Origin × Dest 
(626)
Origin × Year 
(765)
Destination dummies  Yes  No  No  Yes
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  No
R2 within  0.40  0.12  0.13  0.41
Observations  9,610  9,610  9,610  9,610
Notes: z statistics in parentheses. Constant terms and coefficients on year and destination dummies are not reported.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
 * Significant at the 10 percent level.
MAY 2016444 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
 distance, and this probably reflects the costs and 
risks of irregular migration. The attractiveness 
of destination countries is reflected in unem-
ployment rates rather than in GDP per capita. 
But the unemployment effect is small: a 4 per-
centage point fall in unemployment leads to a 1 
percent increase in asylum claims.
The regression in column 2 includes fixed 
effects for  origin-destination dyads and so the 
migrant stock and distance drop out. It also 
includes the combined policy index, and the 
negative coefficient shows that tougher asy-
lum policy does have a significant deterrent 
effect. In column 3 the policy index is disaggre-
gated into its three component parts. Policy on 
access to the territory and on the processing of 
asylum claims both give strong negative coef-
ficients while the coefficient on welfare condi-
tions is positive and marginally significant. In 
column 4 the dyad fixed effects are replaced 
by  origin-country-by-year effects. This is an 
important test because it absorbs all the idio-
syncratic  origin-country effects, which may be 
inadequately captured by crude indicators of 
political conditions. Nevertheless, in this spec-
ification the coefficients on bilateral and des-
tination country variables, including the three 
components of policy, are little changed.
III. So What? Implications for Policy
What do these results imply for the ups and 
downs of asylum applications and for policy? 
For the 48 origin countries, the effects of polit-
ical terror and lack of civil liberties (based on 
column 3 of Table 1) was to reduce applications 
by 14 percent between 2000 and 2006. However 
there is considerable diversity, with predicted 
declines of 44 percent from Afghanistan and 
around 25 percent from Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, 
while there are substantial increases from Côte 
d’Ivoire, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe. Similarly from 
2006 to 2012 the overall predicted increase in 
applications is just 3 percent but with increases 
of 50 percent from Eritrea and Nigeria and 108 
percent from Syria. These results illustrate that 
political terror and human rights abuse are at 
the heart of refugee flights. But addressing such 
issues is more easily said than done. Improving 
economic conditions in origin and transit coun-
tries would help but, as noted above, a 10 per-
cent increase in  origin-country GDP per capita 
would reduce asylum applications by only about 
5 percent. In this light, the EU’s recent offer to 
African and Middle Eastern Countries of 1.8 bil-
lion euros is a small drop in a very large bucket.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that humani-
tarian organizations have focused their effort on 
improving living conditions for those trapped, 
often for protracted periods, in refugee camps 
located in countries that have limited capac-
ity to host large numbers of refugees. As of 
December 2014, Turkey, Pakistan, and Lebanon 
were each hosting more than a million refugees 
while Iran, Ethiopia, and Jordan each had more 
than half a million. Devoting considerably more 
resources to the support, rehabilitation, and 
safe return of refugees would provide greater 
benefit than poorly targeted developmental aid. 
Humanitarian assistance to the even greater 
number of internally displaced persons is just as 
pressing but even more difficult to deliver.
What about domestic policies within the 
western world? Asylum policies have become 
increasingly tough over time with the intention 
of deterring asylum applicants. For the 19 des-
tination countries together, the effect of tougher 
policies on access and processing between 2000 
and 2012 (based on column 3 of Table 1) was 
to reduce annual asylum applications by 21 
percent. Welfare policies have little deterrent 
effect because the fundamental motive driving 
asylum seekers is to gain permanent settlement 
at almost any cost. One implication is that des-
tination countries could improve the conditions 
faced by asylum seekers during processing and 
strengthen their refugee integration policies 
without fear of increasing the number that apply.
European policies have been severely tested 
by the crisis in the Mediterranean, and have been 
found wanting. For some years the EU has been 
building a Common European Asylum System, 
but it needs to go much further, focusing on three 
policy areas. First, existing measures to reinforce 
border controls and to combat  people-smuggling 
need to be greatly strengthened. The results pre-
sented here suggest that such policies would 
need to be draconian, as illustrated by Australia 
in 2001 and 2013 (Hatton and Moloney 2015), 
in order to substantially reduce the numbers 
attempting the hazardous sea crossing. Such 
policies would reduce the incentive for ille-
gal migration and help to prevent people from 
drowning at sea. As public opinion is strongly 
against illegal immigration, such measures 
would help to restore public confidence in the 
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asylum system. It also would reduce the num-
ber of asylum applicants that fail to gain refugee 
status, many of whom melt into the underground 
economy. But it would screen out genuine refu-
gees as well as economic migrants.
Second, in addition to providing more support 
for refugees hosted in poor countries, the EU 
should develop a substantial program of resettle-
ment of refugees from the refugee camps close 
to the sources of violence. A vastly increased 
resettlement scheme would focus on refugees 
whose claims were assessed before being trans-
ferred, thus providing a safe channel for genuine 
refugees while filtering out those less deserv-
ing. That way, protection would be targeted to 
those most in need of it rather than those with 
the energy, enterprise, or resources to risk the 
boat trip to Europe. The evidence suggests that 
public opinion is increasingly favorable toward 
genuine refugees and so that too would help to 
restore and retain support for the refugee regime.
Third, increase the overall capacity of devel-
oped countries to host refugees. There is a 
strong argument for deeper cooperation between 
destination countries, for which there is con-
siderable public support (Hatton 2015). Most 
people would wish to see refugees given a safe 
haven somewhere but are reluctant for their 
own country to bear the economic and social 
cost. Refugees can therefore be seen as a locally 
provided public good, which in the absence of 
cooperation, will be  under-provided. The EU’s 
Common European Asylum System  has focused 
on reinforcing the external border and harmoniz-
ing policies within it, but not, until very recently, 
on  burden-sharing. The distribution of asylum 
claims per capita is very unequal and policy 
has tended to be driven by the countries on the 
EU’s border that face the most pressure. The 
recent agreement to redistribute 120,000 refu-
gees across the EU provides a precedent to build 
upon. Creating a more even distribution among 
developed countries, and especially within the 
EU, could provide more help for refugees by 
easing the overall policy constraint.
Expanding the capacity to host refugees by 
distributing them more widely, maintaining 
 public support for asylum policies with tight 
border controls, and providing safe channels 
through a  large-scale resettlement program for 
those most in need of protection are three of 
the key elements for expanding the capacity 
of developed countries (especially the EU) to 
help genuine refugees seeking a safe haven in 
the Western world. But it in light of the vast 
numbers of displaced people in need of durable 
solutions, such policies can never address more 
than a modest part of a much larger problem.
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